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RICHARD HAAS, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the 
Cold War, New York, Council on Foreign Relations (1997) 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.* 
Dr. Haas sums up his basic approach in terms of law: "I propose 
that the United States adopt a foreign policy based on the notion of regu-
lation." That theme is one of several things that makes this an important 
book. The theme and the title go right to the heart of the challenge for 
US foreign policy in the post cold war world. As important, they do it in 
a way that is easy to understand, thereby enhancing the possibility that 
larger segments of the American public will rise to the challenge. This 
is not a heavy treatise built on a foundation of jargon, making it accessi-
ble only to specialists in international relations or international law. In-
stead, it is brisk, direct, and makes effective use of the regulation, 
sheriff, and posse metaphors to frame the important questions. 
Appropriate political structures, in Dr. Haas' view, are necessary 
for an effective American foreign policy and for a peaceful world. Polit-
ical structures represent a kind of "regulation" in the international arena. 
The cold war provided a bi-polar political structure that offered a place 
for almost all nation states and provided a compass for American foreign 
policy. The end of the cold war left nearly 200 nation states adrift and 
made American foreign policy directionless. The absence of a political 
framework for small or less powerful countries increases the risk of an-
archy. The absence of a coherent foreign policy erodes the basis for the 
necessary political support for any kind of international engagement by 
the United States. 
The "Reluctant Sheriff' explains that all of the post cold war empir-
ical evidence suggests that the United States must exercise leadership. 
In order for this to happen, there must be an intellectual framework 
within the United States from which coherent foreign policy directions 
can be extracted, and there must be a reasonable political consensus sup-
porting international engagement by the US. 
Coherence in either the intellectual framework or in actual foreign 
policy requires simple and understandable goals. Dr. Haas suggests sta-
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bility as the central goal of a post cold war American foreign policy. 
Pursuit of this goal will, on occasion, justify US intervention, which 
sometimes will take the form of military intervention. When this is ap-
propriate, the United States will act in the role of a sheriff. 
The posse metaphor signifies that while the United States is the 
preeminent military power, it is not sufficiently powerful to act effec-
tively alone. It needs participation by other states to support any mili-
tary intervention. Thus, the United States as sheriff can act effectively 
only by persuading others to join its "posse". The implications of Dr. 
Haas' second central goal - free trade - are less clear. Whether major 
threats to free trade would justify military intervention is doubtful. Pre-
sumably the means used to promote free trade would range up to, but not 
beyond, economic sanctions. There also, the US could play the role of 
sheriff but could not act effectively alone and must enlist others in its 
posse. 
Dr. Haas erroneously distinguishes sheriffs from police officers, as-
serting that police officers, but not sheriffs, need explicit legal authority 
to perform their law enforcement functions. On the contrary, the duty of 
a sheriff in Anglo-American law traditionally was to execute writs (spe-
cific orders in specific cases) issued by courts. A sheriff acting without 
such judicial authority would be no different from an ordinary citizen in 
his legal capacity and would be subject to civil liability for conversion of 
property, trespass, battery, and false imprisonment. 
In one respect, that is a meer lawyer's quibble over a metaphor. 
The metaphor provides firm support for Dr. Haas' essential point, which 
relates to the role of the posse and the sheriff's relationship with it. In 
the wild west, the sheriff's legal authority from a writ issued by a court, 
typically an arrest warrant, did him little good as a practical matter. In 
order to effectuate his authority, he needed sufficient physical force to 
overcome the resistance of the subject of the writ. The posse provided 
that coercive supplement to the sheriff. As a theoretical matter, all citi-
zens were obligated to obey the sheriffs command to join a posse. In 
fact, however, whether the sheriff could form a posse was a political 
matter, and depended on persuasion and collective interest rather than 
the law. 
This is the exactly the relationship between international law and 
peace enforcement in the post cold war world. In theory, and under 
international law, the US role as organizer and leader of peace enforce-
ment efforts depends on legal authority - a UN Security Council resolu-
tion, or the privilege of self defense under customary international law 
and article 51 of the UN charter. But the existence of these sources of 
legal authority are hardly sufficient; they do little more than the arrest 
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warrant did for the sheriff in the wild west. What really matters is the 
political practicability of organizing a posse, and that depends on collec-
tive self-interest and on persuasion at the political level. 
But to stop there understates the role of international law, just like 
Dr. Haas' book understates the role of the writ for the wild west sheriff. 
The sheriff in the wild west faced a law suit and damages if he acted and 
organized a posse without a writ. But that was not the important point. 
What is important about the antecedent of the metaphor is that the sher-
iff would not be able to organize a posse as a political matter without a 
writ. He had no legitimacy without a writ. A posse, whether or not 
organized by the sheriff, was a lynch mob unless there was a writ au-
thorizing its formation and activity. Lynch mobs of course formed from 
time to time, but the sheriff had stronger rhetorical leverage and thus 
was more persuasive when he could say to potential posse members, 
"Do your duty. We must enforce law and order" rather than saying, 
"Join my lynch mob." Similarly, in the post cold war international arena 
unilateral action occurs, and to be sure, it is not subject to the obrobrium 
attached to the term "lynch mob". Nevertheless, sources of legitimacy 
found in international law play a major role in the rhetoric leading up to 
the modem form of a posse. The United States had a stronger moral 
position and thus could be more persuasive in Desert Storm because it 
had Security Council resolutions. Similarly, in Bosnia, the US organ-
ized NA TO IFOR was more practicable because there was a source of 
legitimacy both in peace keeping UN Security Council resolutions and 
in the privilege of self-defense because the signatories of the Dayton 
Accords - Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia had requested NATO assistance, 
thereby triggering the privilege of self-defense under Article 52 and cus-
tomary international law. The intellectual challenge for students of inter-
national law and international relations, and the policy challenge is to 
work out the relationship between the US role as sheriff and the appro-
priate metaphor for the writ in the post cold war world. As Dr. Haas 
points out, the mechanisms for obtaining international writs - the UN 
Security Council process especially - is convoluted. Its performance in 
Bosnia was disgraceful. 
But there maybe a richer array of choices than Dr. Haas suggests. 
There may be intermediate possibilities between waiting for a UN Se-
curity Council resolution sufficiently explicit to represent a writ author-
izing military action, and unilateral action by the United States without 
any basis of authority in international law. One obvious possibility is 
commitments by regional authorities. More needs to be done to under-
stand why NATO succeeded where the UN failed in Bosnia Even if 
regional possibilities for issuing post cold war writs can be worked out, 
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that source of authority must be reconciled with the UN Security Coun-
cil's authority under Article 53. Controversy has swelled for years 
around the issue whether Security Council authority is necessary for re-
gional action (most people think not) and whether the absence of post 
action authority negates the legitimacy of continued regional action. 
The need for legitimacy is just as great with respect to the posse 
engaged in application of economic sanctions as with one engaged in 
military intervention. The recent uproar over application of Helms Bur-
ton to punish those violating US economic sanctions against Cuba and 
Iran are examples. The rest of the world does not consider extra territo-
rial application of US law to be legitimate in the absence of some kind 
of imprimatur under international law (and maybe even with such an 
imprimatur). 
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